



SOME DISPUTED QUESTIONS IN THE LAW OF COM-
MERCIAL PAPER.
1. Stipulation for Attorney's Fee in a Promissory Note. A differ-
ence of opinion exists as to the effect which a stipulation for the
payment of an attorney's fee, in case suit is brought upon the
note, has upon the character of the instrument, the stipulation
being expressed in the note itself. The question is whether an
agreement of this character, contained in the note, destroys the
negotiable -nature of the paper, and it has attracted a good degree
of attention within the last few years, by virtue of the important
distinctions existing between the rights attached to negotiable
and non-negotiable paper. If such an agreement destroys the
certainty in the amount of money to be paid on the one hand
and received on the other, then of course it renders the paper
non-negotiable, by depriving it of that which is one of the most
important characteristics of negotiability.
The cases may be divided into three classes. First, those
which maintain the negotiable character of the note, sustaining
the validity of the stipulation. Second, those which deny the
validity of the stipulation, thereby affirming the negotiability of
the note. Third, those denying the negotiable character of the
instrument. We will consider each of these classes in their
order.
(1.) The Supreme Court of Iowa maintains the validity of
the stipulation, upon the theory that it may be considered an
agreement for the payment of liquidated damages,' and in Sperry
I Nelson v. Everett, 29 Ia. 24; Weath- fin, 32 Ia. 445; McIntire v. Cagley, 37 Ia.
erby v. Smith, 30 Ia. 131 ; McGill v. Grif- 676.
VOL. Ill. - N. S. 59
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v. Horr,1 decided in 1874, it sustained the negotiability of notes
containing such stipulations. The provision in that case read:
If not paid when due, and suit is brought thereon, I hereby
agree to pay collection and attorney fees therefor." It is notice-
able that the amount of fees was not certain and fixed, so that
a broader case could not have been presented. It was doubtful
whether the amount finally to be received would or would not
include these fees and costs. It was also doubtful as to what the
fees and costs might amount to. The case certainly enabled
counsel to argue with a good degree of plausibility that the note
in question lacked one of the elements of negotiable paper, that
of certainty in the amount to be received. But the court, in
sustaining the negotiability of the note, or notes, for there were
several of them containing the same stipulation, said : "The sums
payable by the terms of the notes are fixed and certain ; they
are subject to no increase or diminution ; when they matured, no
inquiry was necessary to be made as to facts not apparent on
the face of the notes, in order to fix the amount due ; recovery
could have been had upon the notes themselves, without other
evidence."
In Indiana, too, the negotiability of the note has been sus-
tained, although the stipulation has not been held void. The
question came before the Supreme Court of that State in 1871,
in Stoneman v. Pyle.2 In the course of the opinion the court
said: " On the maturity of the note, the maker knew precisely
what he was bound to pay, and the holder what he was entitled
to demand. In the commercial world, commercial paper is ex-
pected to be paid promptly at maturity. . . .As long as the note
retained the peculiar characteristics of commercial paper, viz., up
to the time of its maturity and dishonor, the amount to be paid
on the one hand, and to be recovered on the other, was fixed
and definite." The negotiability of such notes has since been
sustained by the same court, in Strough v. Gear,-3 decided in
1874.
In 1871, being the same year that the case of Stoneman v.
Pyle was decided in Indiana, the question arose in Louisiana.
In that case, Dietrich v. Bayhi,4 the stipulation in the note was
as follows: I agree to pay "attorney fees of . . . per cent if suit
32 Ia. 184.
2 35 Ind. 103.
8 48 Ind. 100.
4 23 La. Ann. 767.
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be instituted on this note." Notwithstanding this uncertainty,
the negotiable character of the note was sustained.
The Supreme Court of Kansas has also sustained the negotia-
bility of these notes, for very much the same reason as that
assigned by the court in Indiana. The note in this case con-
tained a promise to pay the " costs of collecting, including rea-
sonable attorney fees, if suit be instituted on this note." The
court said the amount due at the maturity of the paper was
certain, and that the only uncertainty was in the amount to be
collected in case the maker defaulted at the maturity of the
paper, and the holder was driven to the necessity of instituting
a suit for collection, adding that even in that case the only un-
certainty would be as to the expenses of such collection. 1
(2.) On the other hand, there are cases which hold that such
stipulations are absolutely void. It follows, of course, that if the
stipulation is a nullity, and to be treated as of no effect, it cannot
destroy the negotiable character of the note. For that which is
void cannot be so far effective as to render a note non-negotiable
by reason of an uncertainty which it sought, but failed to intro
duce into its terms. In Bullock v. Taylor, 2 decided in 1878, the
Supreme Court of Michigan held a stipulation to pay an attorney's
fee to be absolutely void, upon the ground that such an agree-
ment was in the nature of an agreement to pay a penalty. The
decision was announced by Mr. Justice Cooley. In the course
of his opinion, which, it is needless to say, was an able one, he
said: " A stipulation for such a penalty we think must be held
void. It is opposed to the policy of our laws concerning attor-
ney's fees, and it is susceptible of being made the instrument of
the most grievous wrong and oppression. It would be idle to
limit interest to a certain rate, if, under another name, forfeitures
may be imposed to an amount without limit. The provision in
those notes is as much void as it would have been had it called
the sum imposed by its true name of forfeiture or penalty. There
is no consideration whatever that can support it." This case has
since been approved by the same court.8
' Four years prior to the decision in Bullock v. Taylor, the ques-
tion had arisen in Kentucky, in Gear v. Louisville Banking Co., 4
upon a stipulation reading as follows: I agree "to pay a reason-
Seaton v. Scovill, 18 Kans. 433. 8 Meyer v. Hart, 40 Mich. 517.
2 39 Mich. 137. 4 11 Bush, 180.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Am. L. Rev. 851 1882
SOME DISPUTED QUESTIONS IN THE
able attorney fee to any holder thereof, if the same shall here-
after be sued upon." The conclusion announced was that this
agreement was for the payment of a penalty, and that it could
not be allowed to destroy the negotiable character of the note ;
and in the subsequent case of Witherspoon v. Musselman, 1 the
same court held such stipulations void, upon the ground that
they were agreements to pay penalties, tending to the encourage-
inent of litigation and the oppression of the debtor.
In Nebraska, in the case of Heard v. Dubuque County Bank,2
decided in 1878, it was held that stipulations of this character
did not destroy the negotiable character of the note. In that case
the agreement read: " And if suit is brought to enforce collec-
tion I will pay reasonable attorney's fees." The court in consid-
ering the question said : "We do not think that the amount of
money represented by the note or bill is rendered any the less
certain by reason of its containing a stipulation that if it is not
paid at maturity the maker will pay a part of the expenses of its
collection. Such a stipulation adds to the value of the paper,
has a tendency to lower the rate of discount on it, not only
because it promises less expensive collection, but it bears evi-
dence of a greater degree of confidence on the part of the maker
in his ability to pay without suit." It would seem that this case
should have been cited in the first class of cases noted, as sus-
taining both the negotiability of the note and the validity of the
stipulation. But in the subsequent case of Dow v. Updike, this
same court placed itself in line with the Michigan and Kentucky
cases, and held that such stipulations were oppressive and usuri-
ous.8 Indeed, the reasoning in the case of Heard v. the Dubuque
Bank, that such stipulations had a tendency to lower the rate of
interest on the note, was slightly forced, inasmuch as the very
note in question bore the highest rate that the law of the State
allowed.
The question came up in Illinois in Nickerson v. Sheldon,4
decided in 1864. The objection was raised that the note sued
upon was not negotiable, because of the following provision:
" We further agree, that if the above note is not paid without
suit, to pay ten dollars in addition to the above for attorney's
fees." The court held that this did not render the amount due
/
1 14 Bush, 214.
2 8 Neb. 10.
8 11 Neb. 95.
4 33 I1. 372.
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at all uncertain, so as to deprive the note of its negotiability.
"The amount due by this note is absolutely certain, and it pos-
sesses all the requisites of a negotiable instrument under the stat-
ute. There is no uncertainty as to the precise amount of money
to be paid on the maturity of the note." And in the subsequent
case of Short v. Coffeen, 1 decided in 1875, the same court refused
to allow judgment to be entered in an action on a promissory
note for the amount of the attorney fees provided for in the note,
although the provision vas expressed that they were, " in case of
the collection thereof (the amount of the note) by suit at law or
otherwise, to be added to and made a part of the amount due,
or of the judgment." The court declared that the recovery could
not in any case exceed the amount of the note and interest.
(3.) Finally, there is a class of cases, as already said, which hold
that notes containing such provisions must be regarded as non-
negotiable. This doctrine prevails in Missouri, Penhsylvania,
North Carolina, Minnesota, and perhaps Wisconsin. In Missouri
and in Pennsylvania the subject has been before the courts sev-
eral times. The first time it came up in Missouri was in the case
of the First National Bank of Trenton v. Gay, decided in 1876.2
The note in question contained the following provision: "If not
paid at maturity, and the same is placed in the hands of an at-
torney for collection, we agree and promise to pay an additional
sum of ten per cent as an attorney fee." The court said that a
portion of the amount promised to be paid depended on a con-
tingency, whether another portion, specified by the same paper,
was paid on maturity ; that it could not be considered a promis-
sory note, as the amount to be paid was not precise ; and this
ruling has been since adhered to in Samstag v. Conley,3 in First
National Bank of Carthage v. Marlow, 4 which was decided in
1880, as well as in First National Bank v. Jacobs. 5
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in 1877, adopted the same
theory in Woods v. North,6 where the agreement was to pay "five
per cent collection fee if not paid when due, without defalcation."
Mr. Justice Sharswood announced the opinion of the court, and
said : " In the paper now in question there enters an undoubted
element of uncertainty. It is a mistake to suppose that if the
note was unpaid at maturity, the five per cent would be payable
1 76 IU]. 245.
2 63 Mo. 33.
8 64 Mo. 476.
4 71 Mo. 618.
S 73 Mo. 35.
6 84 Penn. St. 407.
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to the holder by the parties. It must go into the hands of an
attorney for collection .... The amount of the percentage can-
not be arbitrarily determined by the parties ; it must be only
what would be a reasonable compensation to an attorney for col-
lection." The reasonableness of the fee was said to be a question
for the jury. This ruling was followed by the same court, at the
January term, 1881, in Johnson v. Speer.1
At the same term that Johnson v. Speer was being decided in
Pennsylvania the subject was considered by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina, and a similar opinion was expressed to that
declared in the former State. The case was that of the First
National Bank v. Bynum, 2 and the provision was for the payment
of " all counsel fees and expenses in collecting the note if it is
sued on or placed in the hands of an attorney for collection." It
was also made payable in current rate of exchange on New York.
Each of these provisions was regarded as rendering it uncertain
in amount, and, therefore, unnegotiable.
In Minnesota the question came up in Jones v. Radatz,8 and
was decided at the October term, 1880. The instrument pro-
vided for " a reasonable attorney's fee if suit be instituted for
the collection of this note." The opinion was delivered by Chief
Justice Gilfillan. After stating that it was essential to the nego-
tiability of a note that it should be certain in amount, he said :
" The instrument before us has this certainty as to the $135 and
the interest, but the whole instrument must be taken together.
The promise to pay the $135 and interest is not the whole of the
promise; not the entire obligation created. The entire obligation
and promise is to pay absolutely that sum and interest, and in a
particular contingency, to wit, the bringing suit by the payee,
after default, to pay a further sum, not fixed, and not capable of
being ascertained from the instrument itself. The suggestion, in
some of the cases, 4 that a stipulation to pay attorney's fee in
case of suit relates merely to the remedy, is not sound, for the
payee, if he recover on that part of the promise, must recover,
not because he is obliged to bring suit, but because it is part of
the contract and obligation of the maker, on which the suit is
brought, that he will pay them on the specified contingency.
1 15 Western Jurist, 119. 4 Sperry v. Horr, 32 Iowa, 128, 184;
2 84 N. C. 24. Seaton v. Scovill, 18 Kan. 433.
8 27 Min. 240.
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Those cases and Gear v. Louisville Banking Company,1 ap-
pear to advance the proposition that the instrument may be
negotiable if the amount with which it may be discharged at
maturity be fixed and certain, even though the amount required
to discharge it after it has passed maturity, or recoverable upon
it in an action, be entirely indefinite, and uncertain. We think
the certainty requisite to the negotiability of the instrument
must continue until the obligation is discharged; and that any
provision which before that time removes that certainty, prevents
the instrument from being negotiable at all." The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin banded down a decision on this question at
the December term, 1881, in the case of Morgan v. Edwards.2
The agreement in this note read as follows: " We also agree to
pay all expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in collecting,
without any relief from valuation or appraisement laws." This
agreement, it will be observed, was very broad, and if not void
as being a stipulation for a penalty, could hardly be regarded
otherwise than as introducing a very uncertain element into the
note in question. The court did not enter into any discussion of
the question of the validity of the stipulation. But on the other
question, the uncertainty in amount, the court said: "A large
number of cases have been cited which hold that if the amount
payable at the maturity of the paper is fixed and certain -the
instrument containing the other essentials of a note - it is still
a note, although it contains a further promise to pay an uncertain
sum for expenses or costs of collection if not paid at maturity,
or if.suit be brought upon it. We have examined many of these
cases, and in all thus examined we find express stipulations that
such expenses or costs are only payable provided default be made
in the payment of the note at maturity, or unless suit be brought
upon it, which implies a default. . . . This case does not require
us to determine whether an instrument providing for the pay-
ment of an uncertain sum for expenses of collection or of a suit,
in case of default, can or cannot be a promissory note. The
stipulation to pay such expenses contained in the instrument in
suit is not made contingent upon default of payment at maturity.
If the money had been paid at the specified place on the day it
was due, the defendants were liable under their agreement to
pay the holder's necessary expenses of receiving it. If the bank
1 11 Bush, 180. . 2 14 Central Law Journal, 33.
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received it for the plaintiff, it might lawfully charge a fee for so
doing, as the holder might have sent some other agent to the
bank to receive the money, and such agent would have been en-
titled to compensation for his services. In either case, the charges
would be expenses incurred in collecting the money, and such
expenses the defendants agreed to pay by the terms of the instru-
ment. Because of this, and because the amount thereof is un-
certain, the instrument is not a promissory note, and therefore
not negotiable." We have quoted somewhat at length from this
decision, to show the important distinction which the court took
in this case. Attention should also be called to the fact that this
same court, in the case of Leggett v. Jones,' had held that an
instrument in the form of a promissory note, for the payment of
a certain sum of money, "with exchange on New York," was in
fact a promissory note. In Morgan v. Edwards the decision in
that case is alluded to. " The question in that case," said the
court, " was not whether the instrument was a note under the
law merchant, but whether it was a contract for the payment of
money only under the code. The question was answered in the
affirmative, and that is the whole basis of the judgment. The
case cannot justly be regarded as authority for the proposition
that an instrument containing such a stipulation can be a prom-
issory note, although it has been so referred to in some of the
elementary books." The court, however, goes on to express the
opinion that such a provision would not destroy the negotiable
character of the instrument. " In Leggett v. James the note
was payable at the Dodge County Bank, with exchange on. New
York. Had the note been made payable in New York, no one
would claim that there was any uncertainty in the amount, al-
though the maker would necessarily have been subjected to the
expense, uncertain in amount, of providing funds there to meet
it. It is precisely that expense which constitutes and governs
the cost of exchange. Hence, the same sum of money which
would have been required to pay the note in New York would
have paid it at the Dodge County Bank, including the exchange,
according to its terms." There are cases which take a contrary
view, upon the theory that the rate of exchange varies. 2 But
without entering upon the discussion of that question we may
1 10 Wis. 34. 2 Read v. McNulty, 12 Rich. Law, 445;
"Lowe v. Bliss, 24 Ill. 168.
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remark that the weight of authority is no doubt in harmony with
the doctrine announced in Leggett v. James. 1
This examination of the authorities shows that the negotiability
of notes containing provisions for the payment of attorney's fees
in case of non-payment at maturity is sustained by decisions in
eight States, -in Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Illinois,
Louisiana, Michigan, and Nebraska. It shows, too, on the other
hand, that the courts of four States - Missouri, Minnesota, North
Carolina, and Pennsylvania - reach a contrary conclusion, and
hold such notes to be non-negotiable, while the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin evidently inclines to the same opinion. The ques-
tion has not arisen in the Supreme Court of the United States,
although it has twice been raised in the circuit courts of the
United States. In Farquhar v. Fidelity, &c. Deposit Company 2
(U. S. C. C. D. Pa.), approbation was expressed of the doctrine
which holds such notes to be non-negotiable. After approv-
ing the Pennsylvania case of Woods v. North,8 it was added:
"Although there may be reason for the difference of opinion
which exists as to the effect upon the commercial character of
a note of a provision for the additional payment of a fixed per-
centage for collection, which is expressed upon its face, yet
there is no conflict of opinion as to the effect of such a provi-
sion where the amount of the addition is determinable only by
extrinsic evidence." The note provided for the payment of an
attorney's fee of five per cent for collection, in case suit was
instituted thereon. But in the Circuit Court for the District
of Kansas the negotiability of notes containing a provision for
an attorney fee was maintained in the case of Howenstein v.
Barnes, 4 decided in 1879. The note was made in Kansas, and
was payable in Missouri; but the question was considered as
one of general commercial law, and decided as such. An ex-
amination of the cases shows that the opinion expressed in the
Circuit Court of Pennsylvania, that there is no conflict of
opinion as to the non-negotiability of the note when the amount
of the addition made by such a provision is determinable only
by extrinsic evidence, is wholly unwarranted by the cases; for,
passing, of course, the cases which have arisen where the stipu-
1 Bradley v. James, 4 Bissell, 473; John- 2 7 Central Law Journal, 334.
son v. Frisbie, 15 Mich. 286; Grutacap v. 3 Supra.
Woulluise, 2 McLean, 581; Pollard v. 4 5 Dillon, 482.
Henies, 3 P. & P. 335.
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lation was held void, we find that in Iowa, Indiana, Louisiana,
and in Kentucky and Nebraska, in cases arising before the stipu-
lation was held void, extrinsic evidence was necessary to deter-
mine the amount to be added. What is a reasonable attorney's
fee is certainly a question to be determined by extrinsic evi-
dence, and costs of collection must also be shown by extrinsic
evidence.
It may be remarked, too, that the Supreme Court of Dakota
has sustained the validity of a provision stipulating for a sum
certain for attorney's fees, in case suit was brought. The Louis-
iana, Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana cases were approved ; but the
decision was based on a provision of the statute, which was as
follows: " The parties to a contract may agree therein upon an
amount which shall be presumed to be the amount of damage
sustained by a breach thereof, when, from the nature of the case,
it would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual
damage." 1
Iu addition to the States already named, there is little doubt
that the negotiability of notes providing for an attorney fee
would be sustained in Ohio, and also in Virginia. As early as
1833, the Court of Appeals of Virginia, in Toole v. Stephen,2
held that a provision in a promissory note for the payment of
costs of suit, and a commission for its collection, was a usurious
agreement. And the Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Taylor,8
decided in 1841, held that an agreement in a promissory note to
pay an attorney fee not exceeding five per cent' was void as
against public policy. If these stipulations are to be treated as
void, they cannot be allowed to destroy the negotiability of the
notes containing them. It seems to us to be more consistent
with public policy to consider all such agreements as absolutely
void. They can readily be used to cover usurious agreements,
and excessive exactions may be made under the guise of an at-
torney's fee. It is not only a protection to the debtor to protect
him against such demands, but the interest of the creditor is also
promoted, by enabling him the more readily to dispose of or ne-
gotiate the note than he possibly could do if the note was to be
considered as non-negotiable. The decided preponderance of au-
thority is, as we have seen, in favor of the negotiability of notes
1 Farmers' National Bank v. Rasmus- 2 4 Leigh. 581.
sen, 1 Dakota, 60. 8 10 Ohio, 378.
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containing such stipulations. The conclusion thus reached in
the large majority of the cases seems to us to be correct, whether
it is based upon the theory that the stipulation is void, or upon
the fact that the amount due at the maturity of the note is fixed
and certain. We very much doubt whether the opposite con-
clusion, reached by the courts in Missouri, Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, and Minnesota, will be adopted in many of the States,
notwithstanding the respect which may be entertained for the
tribunals which have approved it.
2. Rate of Interest after Mdturity of Note. Where the rate of
interest specified in a promissory note is either greater or less
than the legal rate, and the note contains no provision as to the
rate after maturity, the question arises whether the note con-
tinues to draw the same rate after as before maturity. The courts
widely differ in their answer to this question ; some of them
strenuously maintaining that the contract rate governs as well
after as before maturity, while others insist, with an equal degree
of confidence, that the legal rate must govern, unless it is ex-
pressly provided that the contract rate shall continue after
maturity.
In the Supreme Court of the United States the rule was an-
nounced, in Brewster v. Wakefield,' decided in 1859, that, in the
absence of a provision to the contrary, the statutory rate would
govern after maturity. The opinion washy Chief Justice Taney,
and the question came up from the territorial court of Minnesota.
It is not unlikely that the very excessive rate of interest which
the note called for had much to do in influencing the court to
th? conclusion reached ; but the doctrine thus announced has
since been adhered to by that tribunal. It was followed in
Burnhisel v. Firman, , decided in 1874; and in the recent case of
Holden v. Trust Co., 3 decided in 1877, Mr. Justice Swayne said:
" If payment be not made when the money becomes due, there
is a breach of the contract, and the creditor is entitled to dam-
ages. Where none has been agreed upon, the law fixes the
amount according to the standard -applied in all such cases. It
is the legal rate of interest where the parties have agreed upon
none. If the parties meant that the contract rate should con-
tinue, it would have been easy to say so. In the absence of a
1 22 How. 127. 2"22 Wall. 176. 3 100 U. S. 72.
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stipulation, such an intendment cannot be inferred. The analo-
gies relied upon to support a different view are obviously dis-
tinguishable from the case in hand." This case was an appeal
from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, where the
statutory provision is that the rate of six per cent per annum is
allowed upon all moneys due, where there is no contract on the
subject.
But this question is regarded as being purely one of local law
and where the courts of any State have adopted a contrary rule,
the rule so adopted will be applied by'the Supreme Court of the
United States to notes governed by the laws of that State.
This principle was established in the case of Cromwell v. County
of Sac,1 decided in 1877, where Mr. Justice Field followed the
rulings of the Supreme Court of Iowa. In the case of Holden
v. The Trust Co., already cited, Mr. Justice Swayne says, "The
question is always one of local law." And in the case of
Town of Ohio v. Frank, 2 but recently decided, Mr. Justice
Woods, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, acted on
the same principle, applying the rulings of the Supreme Court of
Illinois.
The earliest American case which we have found sustaining
the doctrine announced in Brewster v. Wakefield, and one which
seems to have been generally lost sight of, is that of Gaillard v.
Ball,3 decided in South Carolina in 1818. In that case, a person
bad entered into a bond, conditioned for the payment of four
per cent interest on certain legacies till the legatees came of age,
and as each legatee came of age, to pay him his proportion of the
principal. The court held him bound to pay the statutory rate
from the time the principal became due. Justice Nott delivered
the opinion, saying: "The defendant's testator stipulated to pay
four per cent up to a given time, and then to pay the principal.
This contract to pay four per cent ended at that time, and his priv-
ilege to pay no more ended with it. A person is always bound
to pay legal interest except where there is an agreement to take
less. In this case the plaintiff did not agree to take less, any
longer than until the principal became due. The law, which the
parties had made for themselves, having ended at that time, the
contract was governed by the law of the land afterwards." Jus-
1 96 U. S. 51.
2 13 Central Law Journal, 55.
8 1 Nott & McCord, 67.
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tice Gantt, however, thought otherwise, and said that no greater
rate of interest should be allowed, on the coming of age of the leg-
atees, than that which was stipulated by the bond. The rule in
South Carolina seems to be settled that the contract rate will
govern after maturity. In Langston v. S. C. R. Co.,' decided in
1870, the Supreme Court of that State expresses the opinion that
the weight of authority is in favor of Brewster v. Wakefield. And
in the more recent case of Briggs v. Winsmith, 2 decided as late
as 1878, the same doctrine is asserted, the court saying that as no
contract appeared to govern the rate of interest from aid after
the maturity of the note, the statutory rate must govern as de-
termining the measure of damages.
The question arose in Pennsylvania as early as 1842, in Lud-
wick v. Huntzinger,3 a case much relied on in Brewster v. Wake-
field. The bond provided for interest at the rate of six per cent,
and the court held that this agreement as to interest only ex-
tended to the period fixed for the payment of the debt; that
after maturity the statutory rate of six per cent governed. No
reference was made to the early case of Gillard v. Ball, decided
almost a quarter of a century before in South Carolina, but the
same conclusion was reached on the same reasoning. " Until the
bond became payable," it was said, "the agreement of the parties
regulated the allowance of interest, and the rate of it; but after
that the law interposed, not only to allow, but to regulate the
r'ate of interest that should be paid by the defendant or debtor
for and on account of his illegal detention of the debt from the
plaintiffs. Whenever one man binds himself to pay a specific sum
of money to another by a certain day, and he fails to do so, he
becomes liable by the law of this State to pay interest thereon at
the rate of six per cent per annum, afterward, as long as he shall
improperly withhold payment thereof, unless, perhaps, it should
be expressly agreed otherwise."
In 1858, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Mason v. Callen-
dar,4 laid down the same principle, saying : " Interest is the crea-
ture of the contract, and as such is only recoverable during the
continuance of the contract. When the agreement is violated the
promisee has sustained a wrong for which the law gives him re-
dress by way of damages." This case was followed by the same
1 2S. C. (N. s.) 248. 3 5 W.& S. 51.
2 10 S. C. (N. s.) 133. 4 2 Minn. 350.
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court in a number of decisions,' until, in 1879, the legislature
interfered and passed the provision cited below.2
In Robinson v. Kinney 3 the Supreme Court of Kansas, in
1863, followed Brewster v. Wakefield, considering that case
as decisive of the question, inasmuch as the statute of that
State was similar to the one passed on by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the latter case ; and this was fol-
lowed in 1866 in Searl v. Adams.4  Such, too, is the rule in
Maine,5 adopted in 1877, the court saying: "The practice
in this State has been in accordance with the rule laid down
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Brewster v.
Wakefield, and we see no reason for departing from it."
The same doctrine is also maintained int Arkansas in several
recent decisions, being announced for the first time in 1876. The
subject came up in Rhode Island 7 in 1877, and the court said the
parties were not entitled to interest subsequent to the maturity
of the note, at the stipulated rate, on the idea of an implied con-
tract for such interest, and that if the same rate should be
allowed it would be on the assumption that such was the
measure of damages; but it was held to be more in keeping
with the spirit of the statute to allow only the statutory rate
of six per cent.
In Kentucky 8 the matter came up in 1876, and it was held
that the statutory rate would govern after maturity. "Whatever
interest," said the court, " is recoverable upon the note after ma-
turity, is recoverable not upon the stipulations expressed in the
writing, but upon the provisions of the statute. If the right to
interest depended alone upon the contract, and was not given by
law, the appellee would not be entitled to any interest after the
maturity of the note, and could only recover, if at all, by way
of damages for withholding the money due."
The Supreme Court of Indiana had occasion to determine this
1 Talcott v. Marston, 3 Minn. 339; 3 2 Kan. 184.
Lash ,. Lambert, 15 Minn. 416; More- 4 3 Kan. 513.
land v. Lawrence, 23 Minn. 84. 5 Duran v. Ayer, 67 Me. 150; Eaton v.
" In case of all notes or other instru- Boisonault, ib. 540.
mcnts bcaring interest, when no rate of ( Newton v. Kennerly, 31 Ark. 627
interest is specified after maturity, the said Pettigrew v. Summers, 32 Ark. 571
note or other instrument shall be construed Woodruff v. Webb, 32 Ark. 613.
to bear the samne rate of interest after ma- 7 Pearce v. Hennessy, 10 R. I. 223.
turity as before, and until fully paid and 8 Rilling v. Thompson, 12 Bush, 310;
satisfied." Gen. Laws, 1879, ch. 66, § 5. Evans v. Chapel, 13 Bush, 12.
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question at an early day, and the conclusion then arrived at was
directly opposed to the theory which is now recognized by it as
the correct rule in such cases. In 1836, and again in 1838, the
doctrine was recognized in that State that the contract rate con-
tinued after maturity and until final payment.' But in 1879 the
subject was again considered, when the court expressly repudiated
its former rulings, and announced that, in the absence of an
express agreement to the contrary, the statutory rate would
govern after the maturity of the instrument. The matter was
disposed of with few words, the court merely quoting Brewster
v..Wakefield, and declaring that it announced the correct rule.
The contrary theory, on the other hand, has been maintained
by courts of equal standing and ability, and in many cases. As
early as 1820 the question arose in New York, in Miller v. Bur-
roughs, 2 and was disposed of by the remark that " the contract
of the parties is not confined to the time limited for the payment
of the principal, but is general, and continues until the contract
ceases to operate." The subject again came up in 1825, in Van
Beuren v. Van Gaabeck, 3 and it was again held that the contract
rate would continue after maturity as before ; the court remarking
that " the contract of the parties is not confined to the time limited
for the payment of the principal, but is general, and continues until
the contract ceases to operate." These cases have been followed
in a late case in the Supreme Court of that State, Andrews v.
Keeler,4 decided in 1879. In each of these cases, however,
the matter was not considered at length, but was summarily dis-
posed of as a matter of course. Whether this theory would be
sustained by the Court of Appeals is somewhat doubtful, for
while the early cases already cited have not been overruled
expressly, yet doubt has been cast upon them, leaving the
subject somewhat involved. In Ritter v. Phillips,5 decided in
1873, Mr. Justice Folger seemed to regard the matter as an
open question, and one not necessary to determine in that case.
After making reference to the doctrine enunciated in the early
cases, he added: "This has been somewhat shaken in U. S. Bank
v. Chapin, 6 where it was held that when a bank was, by its char-
Bates v. Wernwag, 4 Black. 372; 4 26 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 87.
Kilgore v. Powers, 5 Black. 22. 5 53 N. Y. 586.
2 4 Johnson's Ch. 436. 6 9 Wend. 71.
8 4 Cowen, 496.
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ter, limited to the rate of six per cent in its discounts, yet that
it could recover at the rate of seven per cent from the time the
note it had discounted became payable; and to the same effect
is Macomber v. Duuham." 1 The cases of Bell v. The Mayor,2 and
Hamilton v. Van Rensselaer,8 are also regarded as casting doubt
upon the matter.
The subject next came up in Texas in 1852, in Pridgen v.
Andrews, 4 and was disposed of in an even more summary man-
ner, with fewer words, than in the New York cases. The jury,
in computing the interest, had proceeded upon the theory that
the contract rate continued after the maturity of the note,
*and the court disposed of the subject with the brief remark,
" There is no excess in the interest as estimated by the jury."
In the subsequent year, 1853, the question was again presented,
and this time was a little more fully commented on, the case being
that of Hopkins v. Crittenden.5 After referring to the statute as
fixing the legal rate of interest at eight per cent, and as author-
izing the recovery of that rate when no specific rate was expressed
in the contract, the court held that a specific rate was named
in the note, and that that rate continued after maturity. "It
doubtless was the intention of the parties," said the court, "to
contract for ten per cent interest upon the debt until paid, and
there can be as little doubt that it was the intention of the legis-
lature to authorize the making and enforcing of such a contract."
About this same time, 1852, the subject was considered in
California, in Kohler v. Smith, 6 and a similar conclusion was
reached, without reference to any adjudications upon the matter
elsewhere. The appellant complained that he was charged with
interest upon his note at the rate of five per 6ent a month after it
became due ; and contended that his contract was for that rate from
the time he made the note up to its maturity. " Where there is no
express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest," the
statute provided that money should bear interest at the rate of
ten per cent after it became d-ie. The court said: " This language
is very explicit, and shows that the intention of the act was two-
fold: first, that money demands after maturity should draw in-
terest; and, second, that they should draw interest at whatever
1 8 Wend. 550. 4 7 Tex. 461.
2 10 Paige, 49 (1843). 5 10 Wex. 189.
8 43 N. Y. 46 (1871). 6 2 Cal. 597.
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rate was expressed in the written contract, notwithstanding that
nothing is said expressly about interest after maturity; and it
is only where no rate is agreed on, that the statute rate takes
effect." The State of Nevada adopted the California statute
regulating interest, and the courts of that State have conse-
quently placed the same construction upon it as had previously
been given to it in the State from which it was adopted.'
In Phinney v. Baldwin, 2 decided in 1854, the Supreme Court of
Illinois established the rule for that State, holding that the con-
tract rate continued after maturity, although there was no express
agreement to that effect in the note. No reference was made to
decisions elseVlhere, but the conclusion was based upon the evi-
dent intention of the parties. The note was payable thirty days
from date, and the promise was to pay the principal "with in-
terest from date at five per cent per month." And the court
said: "The note continues to bear that rate of interest so long as
the principal continues unpaid. The maker undertakes to pay
interest at that rate while he withholds payment of the prin-
cipal ; that is the compensation which the payee is to receive
for the forbearance of the money. We entertain no doubt that
this was the real understanding of the parties. It was not their
intention that this rate should cease on the maturity of the note,
and that it should thereafter only bear interest at the rate of ten
per cent per annum. Such a construction could not be put upon
the instrument without doing violence to the intention of the
parties. It wo'uld in effect be making a new contract for them.
They evidently contemplated but one rate of interest, and that
rate was to continue until payment should be made." The
question was up again in 1862, and the court refused to follow
Brewster v. Wakefield, adhering to its former ruling, and declar-
ing " that such is the common-sense understanding of the con-
tract."' And this doctrine is still maintained. 4
No good purpose can be subserved by pursuing the matter
further. Almost all the cases hereafter cited on this subject, as
holding this same theory, base it upon the evident intent of the
parties that the note should bear the same rate after as before
maturity. This theory prevails in-the States already named, and
' Cox v. Smith, 1 Nev. 171 (1865) ; 8 Etnyre v. McDaniel, 28 Ill. 202.
McLane v. Abrams, 2 Nev. 199 (1866). 4 Heartt v. Rhodes, 66 Ill. 351.
.16 Ill, 10S.
VOL. 111. - .N. 60
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in Massachusetts,' Michigan, 2 Wisconsin,8 Ohio, 4 Virginia,5 Iowa,6
and Tennessee. 7 The same doctrine was maintained in Connecti-
cut,8 but has been changed by a statutory provision passed in
1873, and cited below.9 While the matter has not yet been
before the Supreme Court of Missouri, it has been raised in the
St. Louis Court of Appeals, and it was there held that the con-
tract rate continued after maturity. The Court said: "The
question here presented has never been passed upon by our
Supreme Court. We belieVe, however, that by universal usage
in the courts and among business men throughout the State the
rate of interest agreed upon in a written obligation for the pay-
ment of money has always been held to continue until actual
payment, unless a different rule was prescribed in positive and
clear terms. We find in the weight of authority nothing to
justify such an innovation as the defendant here insists upon,
but do find the contrary rule to be better supported by the more
recent and well-considered adjudications." 10
This review of the authorities shows that the Supreme Court
of the United States, and the courts of Arkansas, Indiana, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and South Carolina, ten in number, support the rule that the stat-
utory rate governs after the maturity of the note, unless it has
been expressly provided therein that the contract rate shall con-
tinue ; while the contrary rule has been adopted in the courts of
California, Connecticut, Iowa, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
and Wisconsin, being fourteen in number, and fully supporting
the opinion expressed in the St. Louis Court of Appeals as to the
weight of authority upon this subject. Mr. Justice Field, in the
Supreme Court of the United States, expressed a similar opinion
as to the preponderance of authority.1
1 Brannon v. Hursell, 112 Mass. 63 ; 7 Overton v. Bolton, 9 Heisk. 762.
Union Institution for Savings v. Boston, 8 Adams v. Way, 33 Conn. 431.
129 Mass. 82. 0 "No greater rate of interest than
2 Warner v. Juiff, 38 Mich. 662. seven per cent per annum shall be recov-
3 Spencer v. Maxfield, 16 Wis. 179; ered or allowed for the time after the
Pruyn v. Milwaukee, 1 Wis. 367. money loaned becomes due." And in
4 Monett v. Sturges, 25 Ohio -St. 384; Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 537, it
Marietta Iron Works v. Lattimer, 25 Ohio was held that the statute did not apply,
St. 620. provided the parties had agreed that the
Cecil v. Hicks, 29 Gratt. 1. contract rate should hold after maturity.
6 Hand v. Armstrong, 18 Iowa, 324; 10 l Central Law Journal, 439.
Thompson v. Pickel, 20 Iowa, 490. 11 96 U. S. 51.
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It is worthy of remark that in Kentucky, and also in Maine,
while maintaining the general rule that the statutory and not the
contract rate governs after maturity of the note, it has been found
necessary to apply the contrary theory to notes payable on de-
mand, or within a few days from the date of the instrument.
For instance, in Gray v. Briscoe,1 decided in 1869, the note was
payable one day after date, and bore interest at the rate of ten
per cent, and the court held that the contract rate continued
until the note was paid. " The amount of interest," said the
court, " secured by the contract in excess of the rate of six per
cent per annum for a single day, is so inconsiderable that it is
scarcely reasonable to suppose the parties intended to restrict the
stipulated rate of interest to the maturity of the contract ; but
we must conclude that they intended it to continue until the
debt should be paid." In the case in Maine, Paine v. Caswell,2
decided in 1878, the note was payable on demand, and interest
was payable at the rate of ten per cent, and it was held that the
note bore interest at that rate until paid. But as a matter of fact,
is it any more doubtful that the parties intended that the note
should continue to bear interest at the contract rate when it is
made payable one week after date, or one month, or one year ?
How many days after date must a note be made payable to evi-
dence to the judicial mind that the parties intended tlhat the
principal should bear interest at the rate of ten per cent until
maturity, but supposed that after maturity the value of the money
would immediately decline to the statutory rate of six per cent?
Must it be two days, or twenty? We should judge that the judicial
mind must be possessed of more than human powers of discern-
ment to enable it to determine the intent of the parties, accord-
ing to the number of days after date that the note is made payable.
It is better to concede that it is the common-sense understanding
of the contract, that the conventional rate of interest should
continue until final payment.
3. Liability of Third Person indorsing before Delivery. One
of the most disputed questions in the law of commercial paper
is that concerning the liability of a third person indorsing a prom-
issory note before its delivery to the payee, for the sole purpose
of giving the maker credit. And the question which thus arises
1 6 Bush, 687. 2 68 Maine, 80.
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is not as to which of two theories is the more nearly correct, but
which of a half-dozen is to be regarded as the true one. It is
remarkable that so great a diversity of opinion should exist in
our judicial tribunals upon a question of this character, and it is
matter for serious regret that the opinions entertained ar6 \ so
diverse in character. The law relating to commercial pap~er
should be uniform throughout the commercial world, and it Is
deplorable to find, as we do upon this question, the court in
Massachusetts laying down the law in one way, while in New
York it is laid down in another way, in Illinois in still another
way, and in Indiana in yet another. These different theories as
to the nature of the liability assumed by one indorsing in the
manner named are as follows:-
1. It is presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that
the liability intended to be assumed was that of a joint maker,
of an original promisor.
2. A like presumption is indulged that the parties intended
that the one so signing should assume the liability of a
guarantor.
3. It is held that where one so signs, the liability thereby
created is prima facie that of a first indorser.
4. It is held, on the other hand, that while the liability is that
of an indorser, the one so signing is a second and not a first
indorser.
5. It is held that one so signing is neither presumed to be an
original promisor, a guarantor, nor a first or second indorser ;
but that the blank indorsement implies that the party making it
intended that the payee should have the right to elect in what
capacity he would hold him liable.
6. That the liability is that of an indorser, or that of a surety,
according to the intention with which the one signing became a
party, this intent to be shown by parol evidence.
As to the first of these theories, that the one so signing is a
joint maker, it is supported by a decided weight of authority. ]It
is the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States,
being declared for the first time by that court in 1859, in Rey v.
Simpson,' and followed, in 1877, in Good v. Martin,2 when the
court declared that no reasonable doubt of the correctness of the
1 22 How. 341. .2 95 U. S. 90.
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rule could be entertained. It is the theory which the courts have
adopted in Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Texas, and in Vermont.' The arguments advanced to
support this theory are the following: (1.) The party cannot be
held as a first indorser, for the reason that he is not the payee,
and no one but the payee can be first indorser and put the
instrument in circulation as a commercial negotiable security.
(2.) That no one can be presumed to be a second indorser except
one to whom the instrument has been indorsed, and who has
passed title to another. That if a person indorsing in blank
before delivery desires to limit his obligation to that of a second
indorser, he must employ proper terms to signify that intention,
the rule being that a blank indorsement supposes that there are
no such terms employed. (3.) That the party cannot be held as a
guarantor, for the reason that a guaranty is a collateral engage-
ment to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another
person, and that as such the agreement 'should be in writing, and
signed by the party to be charged. The party's signature is
there, but the collateral agreement is not. (4.) The contract is
ambiguous, because the party has failed to clearly express his
intentions, and therefore it is to be interpreted most strongly
against him and in favor of the payee; that as he cannot be
held either as guarantor or indorser, he must be held as an
original promisor, as it is clear that he intended to be held in
some form.
The second theory, that the party is to be held as a guarantor,
is maintained by the courts of California, Illinois, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Nebraska, and Nevada. 2  It was first promulgated in
Illinois, in 1842, in Camden v. McCoy,8 and was there based on
1 Killian v. Ashley, 24 Ark. 511, 515; Seymour v. Mickey, 15 Ohio St. 519 ; Car-
Best v. Hoppie, 3 Col. 137; Gilpin v. Mar- penter v. McLaughlin, 12 R. I. 270; Car-
ley, 4 Houst. 284; Quin v. Sterne, 26 Ga. penter v. Oaks, 10 Rich. Eq. 17; Carr
224; Collins v. Trist, 20 La. Ann. 350 ; v. Rowland, 14 Tex. 275; Sylvester v.
Woodman v. Boothby, 66 Me. 391 ; Rice Downer, 20 Vt. 355.
v. Cook, 71 Me. 559 ; Woods v. Woods, 2 Ford v. Hendricks,. 34 Cal. 673
127 Mass. 141; Third National Bank v. Stowell v. Raymond, 83 Ill. 120; Fuller
Lange, 51 Md. 138, 145; Rothschild v. v. Scott, 8 Kan. 25; Arnold v. Bryant, 8
Grix, 31 Mich. 150; Stein v. Passmore, Bush, 678; Newton Wagon Co. v. Diers,
"25 Minn. 256; Mammon v. Hartman, 51 10 Neb. 284, 291; Vandoren v. Tjader, 1
Mo. 168; Currier v. Fellows, 27 N. H. Nev. 380.
366; Hoffman v. Moore, 82 N. C. 313; 8 3 Scam. 437.
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a misconstruction of early New York and Massachusetts case,,
especially on certain obiter dicta contained in Herrick v. Cai-
man.1  It is sufficient to say that no case was ever decided
in either of these States, holding that the liability in suca
cases was that of a guarantor. The limits of this article dc)
not permit us to point out how this misconception of those
early cases has arisen. A few years later and the matter came
up in California, in 1852, in Riggs v. Waldo,2 when a similar cor.-
clusion was reached with that arrived at in Illinois. No reference
was made to the adjudged cases, the conclusion being based upon
its own merits. As to the promise not being within the statute
of frauds, the court said: " The first question here is, wheth(r
this kind of guaranty is within the statute of frauds, for the
want of an expressed consideration in writing. While there h.s
been some conflict of opinion, the main current of decisions, and
the better reasoning, maintain the negative of the proposition.
The contract imports a consideration, because it is a promissoiy
note. Each. one who writes his name upon it is a party to it, and
from its commercial character each party to it is an original
undertaker. The liability of one may be with conditions, that
of others without any ; or, in other words, the liability may lie
primary or secondary ; but each name constitutes a direct original
promise founded upon the same consideration."
The third theory, that such an indorser is liable as firit
indorser, has not been adopted by many of the courts. It
prevails only in Alabama, Indiana, Wisconsin,8 and possib'y
in Mississippi.4
The fourth theory, that the liability is that of a second in-
dorser, has found more favor, and is based upon the reasonirg
that without explanatory evidence it is a necessary presumpticin
that the one so signing supposed he would incur no liabilil-y
until the payee had first indorsed. This rule prevails in Iowa,
in New York as to notes which are negotiable, in Oregon, Pen a-
sylvania, and Tennessee.5  As to notes which are non-negotiable,
1 12 Johns. 159. 4 In Jennings v. Thomas, 13 S. & :I.
2 2 Cal. 485. 617, the court say that the liability of cne
s Jordan v. Garnett, 3 Ala. 610.; Hooks so indorsing is prima fade that of an in-
v. Anderson, 253 id. 238; Snyder v. Oat- dorser, but whether the party was hok en
man, 16 Ind. 265; Houston v. Bruner, 39 as a first or as a second indorser is not on-
Ind. 376 ; Heath v. Van Cott, 9 Wis. 516; tirely clear.
King v. Ritchie, 18 Wis. 554. 6 Fear v. Dunlap, I Greene, 335 ; Pheps
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the New York courts hold that the liability is that of a joint
maker, or a guarantor according to the intent of the parties.'
The fifth theory, that no presumption exists as to the character
of the liability assumed, but that the payee may elect in what
capacity he will hold one so indorsing to be liable, is the estab-
lished doctrine of the courts of Virginia2 and of West Virginia.-
In the case last cited, the court, after reviewing the cases and
laying down the above theory as the rule in Virginia and
adopting it as the rule in West Virginia, said: " But the
true nature of the transaction, and the understanding of the
parties to it at the time, may be shown by parol proof, and such
proof may destroy this right of election by the payee, and the
third person backing such note may be held liable only as an
original promisor, or as a guarantor, or as an indorser, according
to the nature of the transaction and the original understanding
of the parties to it. If it is shown by evidence that such third
person signed his name on the back of such a note, at the time it
was made, as security for the maker and for his accommodation,
to give him credit with the payee, such proof does not alter the
right of the payee to hold him bound as original promisor, or as
guarantor, or as indorsor, as he may elect, but strengthens his
prima facie right to elpct. Such option may be exercised at any
time by the payee, and so long as he holds the note may be
changed at his pleasure, even after the institution of a suit by
him against such third person. If it be shown that the under-
standing between such third person and the payee at the time of
the transaction was, that such third person should be bound only
collaterally, such understanding will destroy the right which the
payee would have otherwise had, - of electing to hold him bound
as original promisor."
The sixth and last theory, we notice, is that announced in New
Jersey in Chaddock v. Vanness,4 where it was said that no legal
presumption arises as to the liability which is assumed by such
an indorsement. It is there held that the mere signature of a
third person creates per se no implied or commercial contract
whatever; that the liability will be that of a second indorser
v. Vischer, 50 N. Y. 69; Cogswell v. Hay- Richards v. Warring, I Keyes, 576; Croml-
den, 5 Ore. 53; Schafer v. F. &. M%. Bank, well v. Hewitt, 40 N. Y. 492.
59 Penn. St. 144; Iser v. Cohen, 1 Bax. 2 Orrick v. Colston, 7 Gratt. 189, 199.
421.8 Burton v. Hansford, 10 W. Va. 470.
5 Griswold v. Slocumb, 10 Barb. 402; 4 35 N. J. 516.
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or that of a surety, according to the intention with which he
became a party, and that that intent must be shown by parol
evidence.
In conclusion, it is proper to note the fact that while the courts
of Massachusetts have held in a long series of decisions 1 that
the liability thus assumed was that of an original promisor, and
have even held that parol evidence could not be received to show
that the parties intended that a different liability should be as-
sumed,2 yet such is no longer the rule, owing to legislative inter-
vention. In 1874 the legislature of the State interposed,
passing an act which provided that " all persons becoming
parties to promissory notes payable on time, by a signature in
lank on the back thereof, shall be entitled to notice of the non-
payment thereof, the same as indorsers." 3 And the fact also
remains to be noticed, that while in Pennsylvania it is authorita-
tively settled, as already said, that the obligation assumed is that
of a second indorser, and parol evidence is inadmissible to show
that it was intended that a different liability should be assumed, 4
yet it is held in that State that a memorandum in writing signed
by the party to be charged is admissible to show such an agree-
ment.5
HENRY WADE ROGERS.
I Mojes v. Bird, 11 Mass. 436 (1810); (1871); Allen v. Brown, 124 Mass. 77
Chaffee v. Jones, 19 Pick. 260 (1837); (1878).
Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Met. 504 (1844); s See National Bank v. Law, 127 Mass.
Bryant v. Eastman, 7 Cush. 113 (1851); 72 (1879).
Brown v. Butler, 99 Mass. 179 (1868) ; 4 Jack v. Morrison, 48 Penn. St. 116
Way v. Butterworth, 108 Mass. 509 (1864); Schaferv. F. & M. Bank, 59 Penn.
(1871); Woods v. Woods, 127 Mass. 141 St. 144 (1868).
(18791. 5 Eilbert v. Finkbeiner, 68 Penn. St.
2 Way v. Butterworth, 108 Mass. 509 247 (1871). •
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